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Supreme Court Nominations
Should President Clinton apply a litmus test?
As soon as election returns were in, the
speculation began over how many Supreme Court
vacancies President Bill Clinton would be able to
fill during his four-year tenure: Would he be able
to reverse the pendulum that swung the High
Court over to the right in the last 12 years?
In statements made to this magazine and
elsewhere, Clinton proclaimed his intention to
nominate justices who were committed to
"individual fights protected by our Constitution,
including the right to privacy."
All indications are that the litmus test for
judges in this administration will be the opposite of
that of the previous one: A likelihood to preserve
Roe v. Wade, rather than overturn it, will be the
new yardstick.
Nadine Strossen, president of the American
Civil Liberties Union and a professor at New York
Law School, is comfortable with that particular
test, because she believes it will result in judges
with a commitment to minority, rather than
majoritarian, interests.
Conservative commentator Bruce Fein,
however, disagrees. He warns that any case-
specific litmus test is dangerous and inevitably
politicizes the judiciary.
BY NADINE STROSSEN
In the October 1992 ABA Jour-
nal, Bill Clinton said he would nomi-
nate as federal judges "only men and
women [with] a demonstrated ...
commitment to the individual rights
protected by our Constitution, in-
cluding the right to privacy."
By contrast, the last two admin-
istrations systematically named fed-
eral judges with narrow views about
individual rights in general, who-
consistent with Republican Party
platforms-opposed Roe v. Wade,
which recognized that the right to
privacy encompasses a woman's de-
cision to have an abortion.
Two justices who were appointed
by these presidents voted in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey to overturn Roe
altogether. Three other Reagan-
Bush appointees bitterly disappointed
many conservatives by refusing to go
quite so far. Nevertheless, their opin-
ion so sharply limited Roe that Chief
Justice Rehnquist mocked what re-
mains of that important ruling as "a
mere facade."
Ironically, many conservatives
who applauded the Reagan-Bush "lit-
mus test" now criticize President
Clinton for his pledge to name judges
who will respect the essential pri-
vacy right recognized in Roe. They
protest that it is inappropriate to
seek to ascertain judicial candidates'
views on issues they might well face
on the bench.
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Yes: A Solemn Duty
Their silence up until now sug-
gests that their real quarrel is with
the specific nature of Clinton's judi-
cial "litmus test," rather than with
such tests generally. Would even the
most adamant professed foe of "lit-
mus tests" object, for example, to a
president's commitment to nominate
only judges who believed that the
Court's Dred Scott decision wrongly
upheld slavery, or that its decision in
Brown rightly invalidated segregated
public schools?
Reveals Views on Rights
Under our constitutional sys-
tem, all federal judges have substan-
tial power to affect human rights.
The Supreme Court, as the ultimate
constitutional interpreter, can either
expand or truncate the rights of all
Americans. This power is exercised
by judges with lifetime tenure, sub-
ject to removal only through im-
peachment. Therefore, the appoint-
ment of a federal judge and espe-
cially the appointment of a Supreme
Court justice-has vast consequences
for years to come.
In light of this, presidents have
a responsibility to nominate, and
senators have a responsibility to
confirm, only women and men whom
they believe will uphold fundamen-
tal constitutional rights.
Although all government offi-
cials swear to uphold the Constitu-
tion, those who are elected by major-
ity vote often reflect majoritarian
interests. In contrast, federal judges'
lifetime appointments insulate them
from politics and facilitate neutral
protection of all rights.
For this reason, federal courts
are uniquely situated as the guardi-
ans of individual and minority group
rights, Correspondingly, presidents
and senators have a duty to appoint
as federal judges only individuals
who will fulfill that special role.
These elected officials cannot carry
out that duty unless they are famil-
iar with the judicial candidates' views
about the nature of that role.
Judicial candidates are, of
course, free to refuse to disclose any
of their views, or to assert that they
have not formulated definitive opin-
ions on particular issues. But this
raises questions about the credibility
and significance of any such asser-
tions. A candidate's denial of any
firm views on broad issues of consti-
tutional philosophy and interpreta-
tion addressed in Roe should be far
more troubling than the denial of an
opinion on whether a specific restric-
tion on abortion should survive con-
stitutional muster.
Judicial powers of interpreta-
tion often are tantamount to the
power to restrict or expand the Con-
stitution's reach. Our elected rep-
resentatives should not vest such
lifelong power in any individual un-
less they are satisfied that it will be
exercised with respect for fundamen-
tal rights. U
No: Don't Get Down to Cases
BY BRUCE FEIN
President Bill Clinton's case-
specific Roe v. Wade litmus test for
Supreme Court nominees is worse
than President Franklin Roosevelt's
discredited court-packing scheme.
Clinton should be emulating
President Abraham Lincoln. When
he nominated Salmon P. Chase as
chief justice, the two burning con-
stitutional issues of the day were
slavery and legal tender laws. Asked
whether his nominee would cast a
politically correct vote in such cases,
Lincoln retorted: "We cannot ask a
man what he will do, and if we
should, and he should answer us, we
should despise him for it."
Last June, the Court reaffirmed
Roe by a 5-4 margin in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. Spurred by a
vaulting ambition worthy of Shake-
speare's Macbeth, Clinton instantly
pandered to his pro-choice constitu-
ency by vowing to extort from his
Court nominees a commitment to
Roe. He voiced no reservations about
de facto coercion of Supreme Court
justices by exploiting their ambition
for appointment during the selection
process leading to nomination.
Clinton's plan to annex the judi-
ciary as a partisan arm of the execu-
tive would subvert the legitimacy of
High Court rulings, enlightened law,
and the ability of the judiciary to
check the excesses of popular govern-
ment. Even more lamentable, Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun has endorsed
Clinton's benighted case-specific lit-
mus test in his concurrence to Casey.
As Justice Felix Frankfurter
said in Offutt v. United States (1954),
"[J]ustice requires the appearance of
justice." That appearance is destroyed
ifjustices have committed their votes
in the Oval Office in particular cases
before hearing the litigants argue,
deliberating with their colleagues,
and enjoying the intellectual inde-
pendence secured by life tenure. Their
votes would smack of the Queen of
Hearts' jurisprudence in "Alice's Ad-
ventures in Wonderland": "Sentence
first, verdict afterwards."
Induces Political Correctness
Without the appearance of jus-
tice, voluntary compliance with High
Court decrees is problematical. And
the rule of law would crumble if
every controversial ruling required
enforcement by bayonets A la Little
Rock, Ark., after the Court's desegre-
gation decisions.
Clinton's promise of voting com-
mitments would also debase the qual-
ity of decision-making. When con-
fronted with pledging a politically
correct vote, a nominee seduced by
an ordinary amount of ambition is
unlikely to proffer intellectually pure
views. The wish becomes father to
the thought. To paraphrase Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the lust for
judicial power "distorts the judg-
ment," "makes what previously was
ILLUSTRATION BY TIM TEEBKEN
clear seem doubtful," and bends "even
well-settled principles of law."
Specific constitutional decisions
should not be warped by the unin-
formed and result-oriented views of
the president. That understanding
was a cornerstone in the defeat of
President Roosevelt's 1937 court-
packing scheme.
Roosevelt's maneuver was cor-
rectly perceived as lethal to the
Court's independence and its check
against majoritarian tyranny. Con-
gress decisively rejected the meas-
ure, and the judgment of history has
condemned Roosevelt.
If Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George Bush had extracted prom-
ises from their Supreme Court nomi-
nees to overrule Roe, they would
have been properly denounced by the
media, and might properly have been
impeached by the House and con-
victed by the Senate. But Reagan
and Bush renounced any case-spe-
cific litmus tests, a fact corroborated
by the votes of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter to reaffirm Roe
last June.
Presidential inquiry into the
philosophies of Supreme Court can-
didates is unobjectionable, even if
the responses give clues as to voting
in prospective cases. That is a time-
honored practice that has not com-
promised judicial independence. Case-
specific inquiries, in contrast, would
breach that delicate wall of separa-
tion between law and politics. U
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